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How to make 
competition 
policy fit for 
the digital age?
In 2019, many reports have been adopted or commissioned by antitrust 
authorities across the world to identify the new issues raised by the digital 
platforms and analyse how they could be dealt with by competition policy. 
What are your main takeaways from those reports? Do you see a consensus 
emerging among economists on the need to adapt competition policy?
Jorge Padilla: Those reports suggest the existence of a broad consensus among 
economists and non-economists on a number of principles. First, contrary to 
what was argued for years, the emerging consensus is that competition policy 
has a role to play in winner-takes-all markets in order to ensure that dominant 
platforms are effectively disciplined by Schumpeterian innovation. Second, 
most practitioners believe that the costs of the type  II errors, i.e., the costs of 
underenforcement, may be very high given that incumbents benefit from network 
effects. Third, they seem to agree that remedying anticompetitive behaviour in 
digital platform markets is a complex exercise and that cease and desist orders 
are unlikely to restore conditions of competition. Hence, ex ante regulation may 
be needed. Not everyone agrees, of course, but there is a growing majority of 
economists that subscribe to these propositions. The problem, in my opinion, is 
that as a result we may end up adopting horizontal regulations that treat all digital 
platforms equally, failing to reflect important differences in business models and 
market positions. It is important to focus intervention on those platforms which, 
due to their market power and business models, have the incentive and ability to 
behave against the public interest.
Jacques Crémer: I agree with basically everything that Jorge said; let me just add 
two additional points. First, the reports stress that the economics of the digital 
age are different. As the Stigler Center report puts it, markets are prone to tipping 
and “the competitive process shifts from competition in the market to competition 
for the market.” This does not imply that competition policy has no role, but does 
imply that it must rethink its tools and that the law—at the minimum the case 
law—must be adapted. Second, the growing importance of data in the digital 
economy requires new thinking—should we target “excessive” accumulation 
of data by large platforms or simply abusive use? Should we, and how, enforce 
data sharing? Which issues should be treated by competition law, by specific data 
regulation or by privacy law? I should add that at the University of East Anglia, 
Sean Ennis and Amelia Fletcher have done a great service to the competition 
policy community by comparing at a fine level of detail the recommendations of 
the UK, Stigler Center and EU reports; see Developing international perspectives 
on digital competition policy on SSRN). They point out their similarities, 
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In its new Digital Strategy adopted in February 2020, 
the European Commission announces a review of 
the fitness of the competition rules for the digital age. 
Could you give the three most important reforms 
that should be done by the Commission to improve 
the fitness of the rules?
Jorge Padilla: First, I believe that we need to reconsider 
market definition. It is now a static notion that needs 
to be adapted to incorporate the dynamic competitive 
threats that platforms face from potential competitors. 
Most likely, this will lead to wider markets and may 
make it more difficult to establish dominance. But, on 
the other hand, it will facilitate intervention against killer 
acquisitions, since some platforms that may be regarded 
as complementary under a narrow market definition 
could be seen as competitors when a wide market (e.g. the 
market for attention) is defined.  Secondly, I believe we 
may need to close an enforcement gap in Article  102 
TFEU. Unlike in the US, EU law does not condemn 
unilateral actions by non-dominant players that attempt 
to monopolise markets anticompetitively. The problem is 
that non-dominant platforms may scale up very quickly 
and thus may achieve dominance in the blink of an eye 
using strategies that their competitors cannot replicate 
and/or contest. This is particularly problematic in the 
case of conglomerate platforms (i.e., firms operating 
multiple platforms) because they can engage in predatory 
strategies in markets where they are not present, taking 
advantage of their ability to recoup instantaneously 
through their other platforms where they possess some 
market power but cannot be regarded as dominant. 
Finally, I believe it is essential to reconsider the remedies 
imposed in platform markets: cease and desist orders have 
proved ineffectual and access remedies may not be able to 
restore conditions of competition when the market has 
already tipped. We thus need to reconsider the pros and 
cons of structural remedies. 
Jacques  Crémer: Let me preface my answer by stating 
that there is only so much that competition policy can 
do. It is a real problem that none of the large platforms 
which structure much of the access to information and 
goods in the world are European, and this is not due to 
anticompetitive behaviour by these platforms. We need 
rigorous thinking, effective action and political courage 
to tackle the lack of innovation in Europe and I find 
“Shaping Europe’s digital future” weak in that regard. 
“ We need to reconsider market 
definition. It is now a static 
notion that needs to be adapted 
to incorporate the dynamic 
competitive threats that platforms 
face from potential competitors.” 
To get back to the question, we should indeed reconsider 
market definition, but its importance should also be 
downgraded and replaced by a focus on the analysis of 
the competitive threats that large platforms face (or do 
not face!). Second, competition policy will not prevent 
the existence of large and dominant platforms. There 
may be relatively little to impose competition “for the 
market,” that is ensuring that the dominant position of 
some of the large platforms is under threats from entrants. 
On the other hand, we should vigorously pursue policies 
that ensure that there is competition “on the market,” 
that is to ensure that the ecosystems or the marketplaces 
that they manage are open. Finally, something should 
be done so that the decisions of competition authorities 
are taken much faster. This will require a combination of 
changes in their organisation and, maybe, greater reliance 
on regulation or on per se illegality.
The Commission will also explore the need for “ex ante 
rules to ensure that markets characterised by large 
platforms with significant network effects acting as 
gatekeepers, remain fair and contestable.” Do you think 
that such regulation is necessary to complement ex 
post competition policy?
Jorge Padilla: Yes, I am in favour of ex ante regulation 
provided it has a subsidiary role. Like in the regulation 
of electronic communication services, it is essential 
that ex ante regulatory obligations should only be 
imposed where there is not effective competition, i.e., 
in markets where there are one or more undertakings 
with significant market power, and where competition 
law remedies are not sufficient to address the problem. 
For example, I believe that access remedies may have to 
be imposed in these industries in circumstances where the 
conditions of the so-called “exceptional circumstances 
test” laid out in Bronner or Microsoft fail to apply. This 
is because dominant platforms may be able to soften 
and/or eliminate competition in adjacent markets even 
in situations where access to them is not indispensable 
to compete in the short term but where access to them 
is crucial to reach a critical mass and, hence, be able to 
compete effectively in the long term. 
“ There seems to be an emerging 
consensus that remedying 
anticompetitive behaviour in digital 
platform markets is a complex 
exercise and that cease and desist 
orders are unlikely to restore 
conditions of competition. Hence, 
ex ante regulation may be needed.” 
Jacques  Crémer: Indeed, ex ante regulation should be 
simple and fast. However, I have seen very little precise 
thinking about how it would be done, by which type 
of agency(ies), with what type of power, what type 
of mandate and what type of incentives. How would 
they relate to other regulatory agencies or regulations/
laws which already have a long history  (consumer law, 
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consequence of digitalisation (data protection, privacy)? 
From the viewpoint of an economist, a difficulty is 
that there has been very little research in economics of 
regulation for the last twenty-five years—it was quite 
an active field in the 1990s. We urgently need more 
theoretical and empirical research to provide guidance 
on the design of regulatory bodies.I would nuance 
Jorge’s statements about regulation focussed only on 
dominant firms. It is easier to enforce general regulations 
and there are some regulations which could be usefully 
imposed across the board—I am thinking of areas such 
as transparency regulations: for instance, it would make 
the market more competitive if  platforms had to divulge 
when their rankings are influenced by side payments, 
and there is no reason not to impose this requirement on 
smaller platforms also. 
In that regard, how do you assess the “double mandate” 
of the Executive Vice-President Vestager combining 
antitrust and regulatory powers?
Jorge Padilla: I am not in favour or against. As former 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said, “[i]t doesn’t matter 
whether the  cat  is  black  or  white, as long as it  catches 
mice.” There are clear advantages in coordinating 
different policy instruments under the same leadership. 
And yet economic theory suggests that the existence 
of two separate agencies may be more likely to correct 
type  II errors (insufficient intervention), which are the 
sort of errors that motivate the current call for reform.
“ The focus of the reform should 
be placed on the control of 
the unilateral conduct of firms 
operating platform businesses, 
especially those whose business 
models involve the sequential 
entry and domination of adjacent 
platform markets.”
Jacques  Crémer: I was very excited when I saw that 
Commissioner Vestager was put in charge of the political 
priority “Europe Fit for the Digital Age.” The problem is 
not so much whether one person has both antitrust and 
regulatory powers, but to have a well-defined procedure 
for coordination of policies which impact the digital 
economy. For instance, it is clear that labour law has to be 
adapted to the growing importance of the gig economy 
and that this should be done in a way that promotes not 
only fair and efficient labour markets but also a vibrant 
market for new forms of labour. I was hoping that 
Commissioner Vestager would somewhat be in charge of 
ensuring this coordination. Alas, her mission letter was 
somewhat disappointing in this regard, as it provides her 
a list of very specific areas to tackle rather than defining 
a broad area of competence. I hope that the practice will 
be better.
To be more specific, there is now a debate in many 
European countries on the criteria to identify the digital 
platforms which may justify strengthened supervision 
by antitrust and/or regulatory agencies. The Furman 
Report in the UK proposes the “significant market 
status,” the French telecommunications regulation 
(Arcep) proposes the “systemic platform” while 
the 10th amendment of the German Competition Law 
proposes the concept of “paramount importance.” 
How do you view those proposals? What could be 
a relevant threshold?
Jorge  Padilla: Frankly, I believe we should not be 
obsessed with labels. The focus of the reform should be 
placed on the control of the unilateral conduct of firms 
operating platform businesses benefiting from network 
effects, and especially on those whose business models 
involve the sequential entry and domination of adjacent 
platform markets as a way to entrench their dominance 
in all markets where they operate. I am particularly 
concerned about conglomerate platforms, because their 
wide portfolios make it virtually impossible to challenge 
them in any of the markets in which they operate. 
Jacques Crémer: Again, I basically agree with Jorge. Let 
me just comment on the relevant threshold. We know 
very little about the link between “market share” and 
dominance, in the sense of having “the power to behave to 
an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its 
customers and ultimately of its consumers.” We discussed 
tipping earlier, but some markets with network effects 
seem not be subject to tipping. For instance, in its 
investigation of the acquisition of GitHub by Microsoft, 
the Commission, to my mind correctly, estimated that, 
despite the fact that there are network effects and despite 
the fact that GitHub had a market share above 40%, “it 
is easy for developers to switch hosting platform.” The role 
of competitive analysis as opposed to the determination 
of set thresholds is paramount.
In terms of anticompetitive practices, the recent cases 
and reports revolve mainly around the following 
behaviours: discrimination and self-preferencing; 
access to key innovation capabilities, in particular data; 
bundling and envelopment; and big tech acquisitions. 
Are the current competition economics methodologies 
and tools fitted to deal with those behaviours? 
Jorge  Padilla: Broadly speaking, yes. And yet the devil 
is in the details and those details are missing in many 
of our theories. Thus, further theoretical and empirical 
research is needed to fine-tune our policies. For example, 
in my opinion, we have not clearly established when self-
preferencing is really a problem as a matter of economics. 
Under which circumstances it is welfare reducing to favour 
a subsidiary? Are those circumstances different in digital 
markets? Why are we concerned about self-preferencing 
by platforms but do not object to the use of private 
labels by brick-and-mortar retailers? I am not arguing 
that intervention should be delayed until we have pinned 
down all details. After all, we are still debating about the 
economics of loyalty rebates and that has not stopped the 
Commission from intervening in a number of rebates cases. 
I am simply stating that we should continue improving 
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business models adopted by digital platforms and refine 
our theories of harm so that the pendulum does not swing 
excessively from underenforcement to overenforcement. 
“ There still are lots of work to be 
done to better understand the 
economics of the digital world. 
In the meantime, all involved, 
lawyers, economists, authorities, 
firms, will make mistakes, but 
it would be a worse mistake to 
do nothing.”
Jacques  Crémer: Let me explain why I do not like 
answering questions of the type “Are current competition 
policy/economics/law tools/practices well fit to deal with 
the digital economy?” If  we answer yes, are we saying that 
nothing needs to be changed? This is clearly not the case, 
as our American colleagues who complain about the 
weight of precedents keep reminding us. If  one answers 
no, are we saying that we cannot enforce competition law 
until we have better tools? The best we can honestly say 
is that the tools and methods that we have enable us to 
do some things, but that there still are lots of work to be 
done to better understand the economics of the digital 
world. In the meantime, all involved, lawyers, economists, 
authorities, firms, will make mistakes, but it would be a 
worse mistake to do nothing. 
Regarding remedies design,  several commentators 
recommend a process which is, on the one hand, more 
participatory and, on the other hand, more experimental. 
Do you agree with those suggestions? How could they 
be implemented in practice?
Jorge  Padilla: In my experience, no remedy will ever 
command the support of all parties involved. Dominant 
firms often complain that the remedies imposed unduly 
interfere with their business models and, more precisely, 
with their ability and incentive to engage in disruptive 
innovation. They typically regard all remedies as 
disproportionate. On the other hand, complainants 
complain about the timidity of the remedies adopted by 
the competition authorities. They claim those remedies 
are insufficient to restore the conditions of competition 
that prevailed prior to the abuse. This problem is unlikely 
to be resolved by making the remedy design process more 
participatory, even if  I believe there is merit in consulting 
widely about remedy proposals. In my opinion, what 
we need is to adopt “contingent remedy designs.” That 
is, remedy designs which may unfold in different ways 
over time depending on whether effective competition is 
restored. These remedies could be structured in stages. 
Stage  1 remedies can be relatively simple. No further 
remedies will be imposed if  stage 1 remedies deliver the 
right outcomes but if, on the contrary, they fail to achieve 
their goals, then stage 2 remedies will be triggered, and so 
on and so forth. Stage N remedies may involve structural 
divestments. I believe these dynamic remedy designs 
could achieve much more than the current static designs, 
where agencies bet on their ingenuity and put all their 
eggs in one basket. On the one hand, the remedy designs 
I propose are much more flexible. On the other, they can 
be structured so that they incentivise dominant firms to 
comply with them from the outset (thus avoiding the 
more and more draconian remedies of later stages). 
“ We need to adopt “contingent 
remedy designs”, that is remedy 
designs which may unfold 
in different ways over time 
depending on whether effective 
competition is restored.”
Jacques Crémer: Jorge has more experience than I do on 
these matters, so I will defer to him. Let me just make 
one extra point. Speed is often of the essence. There are 
practices which could kill competition fast, but whose 
prohibition would at most marginally hurt consumer 
welfare. They need to be stopped immediately. As many 
of the reports discuss, we need to change the calculus 
when there is uncertainty, and this is especially the case 
when remedies would be ineffective if  applied too late.
There is now a debate on the burden of proof and the 
establishment of presumption, in particular in case 
of big tech acquisitions. Do you think that, for some 
acquisitions, a rebuttal presumption of anticompetitive 
effects should be established? If yes, for which reasons 
and at which conditions?
Jorge Padilla: Many economists believe that all horizontal 
mergers, whether they involve big tech platforms and 
irrespective of the industry, should be banned unless the 
merging parties can show efficiencies. I disagree because 
I believe that in many instances the alternative to a merger 
is not the status quo but a less efficient form of exit, and 
also because start-ups may find it easier to enter markets if  
they anticipate that they may be acquired by incumbents 
with the ability to scale them up in case their ideas prove 
successful. In any event, if the burden of proof is reversed, 
so that only mergers that can be proved to be efficient will 
be cleared, then we need to reconsider the standard of 
proof regarding efficiencies. Currently, when efficiencies 
are assessed only after the merger is regarded as otherwise 
anticompetitive, the standard of proof for efficiencies is 
very stringent: efficiencies must be material and the merger 
must be indispensable to their achievement. I am not sure 
that this is the right standard of proof if the burden of 
proof is reversed. Would we prohibit a merger that produces 
efficiencies because we believe the efficiencies could be 
achieved in a different way based only on a presumption of 
anticompetitive effects? It seems unreasonable, especially 
because it is not clear to me whether we can presume that 
those supposed anticompetitive effects will be equally 
significant irrespective of the economic context where the 
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“ If the burden of proof is reversed, 
so that only mergers that can 
be proved to be efficient will 
be cleared, then we need to 
reconsider the standard of proof 
regarding efficiencies.”
Jacques Crémer: Let me pick up on the issue of burden 
of proof in general. In our report, Y.-A. de Montjoye, 
H. Schweitzer and I call for a reversal of the burden of 
proof for a certain number of practices. Some of the 
most thoughtful critics of this proposal point out that 
this requires lots of discipline from the competition 
authorities, especially in Europe, where they have more 
power. I stand by our proposals, but if  they are accepted, 
competition authorities need to make sure that they put 
in tools and maybe specialised internal teams to give a fair 
hearing to the arguments of the parties. It is very difficult 
to be both prosecutor and judge and even harder when 
you have to decide whether the “accused” is convincing 
in its rebuttals of your argument.
Jorge Padilla and Jacques Crémer: We would like to end by 
thanking Alexandre de Steel for his challenging questions 
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Electronic version (single user access to the latest online issue for 1 year, no access to archives)
Revue Concurrences l Review Concurrences
Version électronique (accès monoposte au dernier N° en ligne pendant 1 an, pas d’accès aux archives)  595,00 € 607,50 € 
Electronic version (single user access to the latest online issue for 1 year, no access to archives)
Version imprimée (4 N° pendant un an, pas d’accès aux archives) 635,00 € 648 €
Print version (4 issues for 1 year, no access to archives)
Pour s’assurer de la validité des prix pratiqués, veuillez consulter le site www.concurrences.com  
ou demandez un devis personnalisé à webmaster@concurrences.com.
To ensure the validity of the prices charged, please visit www.concurrences.com  
or request a personalised quote from webmaster@concurrences.com.
Devis sur demande
Quote upon request
